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A Lawyer's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Professional
Disciplinary Proceedings
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.t and Cameron Beardtt
Historically, lawyer disciplinary proceedings appear to have been sum-
mary, although a full hearing generally was accorded if the lawyer con-
tested the charge. Today, prehearing administrative inquiry usually dif-
ferentiates among minor disciplinary grievances, serious but uncontested
charges, and serious contested charges. In this final category, the accused
has a right to a trial-type hearing. The nature of the cases that reach this
stage makes it particularly likely that the one intricate procedural issue
that can influence the outcome of the trial is the privilege against self-
incrimination. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of this privilege,
lawyers enjoy less protection than might be supposed. Documents in their
hands can generally be used against them, and in certain circumstances so
can their refusal to testify. In substance, contested disciplinary proceedings
are quasi-criminal. Disciplinary procedures have evolved to reflect
changes in the professional community; the limited privilege available to
attorneys strikes a reasonable balance between the modern lawyer's inter-
est and those of the aggrieved party and of the public.
I. AVAILABLE PROCEDURAL MODELS
In the American legal tradition there are four types of procedure upon
which lawyer disciplinary proceedings could be patterned. In descending
order of their protection of the private person, these are criminal
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procedure, civil procedure of the trial court of general jurisdiction, "some
kind of hearing" of bilateral structure in the tradition of administrative
law, and unilateral or dispensatory administrative justice. Criminal proce-
dure entails eight guarantees:
-The right to notice and a statement of the charge or grievance;
-The right to present evidence and argument, including the right of
cross-examination;
-The right to assistance of counsel. In modern times this has been held
to include the right to publicly provided counsel for a defendant unable to
afford privately retained counsel;
-The right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. No adverse
inference may be drawn from such refusal;
-The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
-The right to appellate review;
-The right to some measure of pretrial discovery; and
-The right to jury trial, in cases where a prison sentence may be
imposed.'
Civil procedure in trial courts of general jurisdiction involves most but
not all of these procedural safeguards, including the right to notice and a
statement of the charge or grievance; the right to present evidence and
argument; the right to assistance of counsel (but, generally speaking, no
right to public provision of such assistance); the right of appeal; and the
right to some measure of pretrial discovery.' Where the proceeding is
characterized as a civil action "at law," there is also a right to jury trial.
Ordinarily a "preponderance of the evidence" standard applies, but in
some types of civil proceedings, the charge must be established by "clear
and convincing evidence." 3 While a civil litigant has the right to refuse to
give testimony that may incriminate him in collateral criminal proceed-
ings, it is generally held that the trier of fact may draw reasonable infer-
ences as to the facts from the defendant's silence.4
1. See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1974); C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1980). Under the United States Constitution there
is no right of appeal in state court, e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-89 (1894), or for that
matter in a federal court. However, the right of appeal is almost universally accorded by statute. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
2. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1985); J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985). The most significant change in civil procedure in
recent times has been expansion of the right of pretrial discovery, so that in most jurisdictions litigants
may obtain discovery of evidence relevant to the "subject matter" of the action regardless of admissi-
bility. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
3. For example, this includes claims involving fraud. See, e.g., Weise v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 286
Minn. 199, 175 N.W.2d 184 (1970).
4. See generally Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases,
91 YALE L.J. 1062 (1982).
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As one turns to administrative agency hearings, and the right to "some
kind of hearing," the established requirements become much less uniform.
The Supreme Court has laid down some minimal constitutional require-
ments for matters in which there is a right to a hearing. These include
notice and a statement of the charges; the right to submit evidence and
argument, if not necessarily to present it in person to the tribunal; the
requirement that there be a modicum of believable evidence, although not
necessarily evidence admissible under general evidentiary rules; and the
right to judicial review.5 Beyond these constitutional requirements, stat-
utes establishing various administrative proceedings generally provide, or
are interpreted to require, the right of cross-examination; the right to as-
sistance of counsel; some pretrial discovery or disclosure; proof by at least
a preponderance of the evidence-and often with a requirement that the
preponderance be established by technically admissible evidence; and a
right to full appellate review.6 Again, there is a right to refuse to give self-
incriminating testimony,7 subject to the tribunal's right to draw inferences
from the party-witness's silence.
At the opposite end of the procedural spectrum from the criminal model
is what might be called dispensatory justice. There is no definite pattern
in this domain, for it encompasses many kinds of governmental decision-
making. One classical type of dispensatory justice is the private legislative
bill;' in seeking to obtain such a bill, the private party has no procedural
rights at all, although he may be granted substantial procedural opportu-
nities. Another example is executive clemency; there is no right to a hear-
ing to obtain a pardon,9 and such hearings are rarely granted. Applicants
for government contracts are sometimes given a statutory right to a hear-
ing concerning the regularity of the competitive bidding in which they
have participated, but there is generally no right to a hearing to determine
the relative competence of competitors."0 On the other hand, some
5. See J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Indepen-
dence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986); Stewart, The Reforma-
tion of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). Compare Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) with Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
6. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557, 701-706 (1982).
7. E.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United
States, 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Binion v. United States Dep't of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1983); Sullivan v.
Askew, 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1977); cf. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
10. See B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983); Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. 11 1986).
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franchises conferred by the government are issued by a procedure that
approximates a full civil trial."1
Notwithstanding this theoretically wide range of procedural options, if
one assumes that the private interest in question is sensitive enough that
there should be "some kind of hearing," then under modern legal princi-
ples the range of choices is considerably narrower. A reasonably fair pro-
cedure under the circumstances would certainly include all the following:
-The right to notice and a statement of the charge or grievance;
-The right to present evidence and argument;
-The right to assistance of counsel;
-The right to appellate or judicial review;
-The right to some kind of pretrial discovery; and
-The privilege against self-incrimination.
This set of procedural standards-now generally accepted if not univer-
sally required as a matter of constitutional law-is of relatively recent
origin, at least where the private interest in question could not unequivo-
cally be called a "right." The development of these standards can, for
instance, be traced in the metamorphosis of lawyer disciplinary
proceedings.
II. THE OLD REGIME IN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, most American jurisdic-
tions have required one who acts as a lawyer for others to be licensed.1 In
the older parlance, and in the Hohfeldian sense, the practice of law is a
"privilege," i.e., a capacity that is not an incident of citizenship but is
conferred by law on a limited number of people who meet specified re-
quirements. Law practice is a privilege in other senses as well. Properly
conducted, law practice is technically and morally exacting; hence not ev-
eryone can do it properly. Lawyers also may receive and must protect
privileged communications. Finally, lawyers are officers of the court, and
as insiders in the system are accorded some degree of immunity from ordi-
nary law enforcement.
The term "privilege" has long been used as a predicate in analysis of
the rules governing both admission to practice and lawyer discipline. The
leading treatise on law practice of the early twentieth century, Thornton's
A Treatise on Attorneys at Law, stated:
The right to practice law is not a natural inherent right, but one
which may be exercised only upon proof of fitness, through evidence
11. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
12. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 825 (1986).
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of the possession of satisfactory legal attainments and fair character.
The privilege of practicing law is not open to all, but is a special
personal franchise limited to persons of good moral character, with
special qualifications .... 13
In a 1911 case delineating the conduct necessary to warrant disbarment,
one federal circuit court made a similar observation: "[Tihe right to prac-
tice law," the court held, is not "a property right, to be treated with all
the incidents peculiar to property," but is "merely an extraordinary privi-
lege. . . granted. . . on certain conditions, upon the reasonable mainte-
nance of which . . .depends . . .continuance in office." 4
Under traditional legal doctrine, this characterization implied that con-
stitutional law would require only a modicum of procedural formality for
revocation of an attorney's license. This is not to say that the practicing
bar would have regarded dispensatory justice as meeting the proper stan-
dard of fairness, so that a license to practice law could have been termi-
nated as readily as, say, government employment. However, the required
proceedings would fall somewhere between dispensatory justice and ad-
ministrative hearings on the spectrum of procedural protections. Courts
certainly made it clear that disbarment proceedings were not criminal, but
civil.15 Indeed, on the prevailing premise that law practice was a privilege,
lawyer disciplinary procedure was structured to facilitate suspension or
disbarment upon a showing of good cause.""
According to Thornton, a petition for disbarment was to set forth veri-
fied allegations specifying with reasonable particularity the misconduct for
which disbarment was sought. If the court found the allegations sufficient
in law, it would ordinarily issue an order against the lawyer in question,
directing him to show cause why he should not be disbarred.17 The bur-
den of proof thus was on the attorney to prove his innocence. There was
little or no pretrial discovery. Appellate review was nominally available,
but the tenor of the decisions suggests that a lawyer found guilty of an
offense warranting disbarment had little chance of obtaining reversal on
either substantive or procedural grounds. The old summary procedure is
13. 1 E. THORNTON, A TRFArlSE ON ATrORNEYS AT LAW 22-23 (1914).
14. In re Thatcher, 190 F. 969, 974 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1911); see also Admission to the Bar, 13
ALBANY L.J. 142, 144 (1876) (endorsing proposals to tighten requirements for admission to bar);
Admission to the Bar, 4 ALBANY L.J. 309 (1871) (criticizing ease of admission to bar as doing great
injury to character and reputation of profession).
15. 2 E. THORNTON, supra note 13, at 1282.
16. Id. at 1281 (footnotes omitted). Thornton said that the procedural requirements for suspen-
sion or disbarment could indeed be minimal: "It is well settled that the court may summarily suspend
or disbar an attorney at law for unprofessional conduct, because he is an officer thereof, providing the
bounds of due process of law are not transgressed." Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 1288-99.
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illustrated in the 1868 case of Randall v. Brigham,18 in which the court
imposing the sanction was apprised of the lawyer's wrong-doing by a
letter from the client which, when not disputed by the lawyer, was relied
on by the court as a sufficient basis for an immediate order of disbarment.
A similar flavor is captured in the more modern case of In re Ruffalo,19
in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting as a discipli-
nary committee, focused on one set of charges and then, after a somewhat
casual proceeding, disbarred on another.
III. MODERN DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
By the 1960's, the old style lawyer disciplinary procedure had begun to
disappear. In re Ruffalo,20 decided in 1968, established as a minimum
constitutional requirement that notice of charges be given and that the
evidence be within the scope of the charge. The Supreme Court had laid
the groundwork for this decision some years before in cases imposing re-
quirements of minimum rationality on refusals of admission to practice.2
In the early 1960's, the Supreme Court also decided a variety of cases
involving lawyers' "solicitation" that further extended constitutional limi-
tations on the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on lawyers.22 In the
same period, as we shall note below, the Court started to move in direc-
tions that would have imposed important constitutional limitations on the
adverse consequences that could follow invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination in lawyer disciplinary proceedings. State appellate
courts also manifested greater concern for procedural fairness in such pro-
ceedings, particularly with respect to the sufficiency of evidence where se-
rious misconduct was charged.2 3 By the middle of the 1960's, if not before,
summary procedure, in which the accused lawyer was required to "show
cause" why he should not be disbarred, was obsolete.
The development of lawyer disciplinary procedure since then seems to
find its motive force in two disparate legal movements. One is the intro-
duction of more elaborate procedure through adoption of legislation and
rules of court at the state level. The other is the retraction by the Supreme
Court of some previously announced or implied constitutional procedural
protections concerning self-incrimination.
24
18. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
19. 370 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
20. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
21. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232 (1957).
22. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
23. See, e.g., In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P 2d 768 (1954).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 66-76.
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Professor Charles Wolfram's excellent new treatise on legal ethics use-
fully summarizes the procedural system emerging in state rules and
statutes:
The states follow several different variations, but a commonly em-
ployed model begins with an informal administrative proceeding to
determine whether the matter should be dismissed or disposed of
with a nondisciplinary admonition or, instead, whether there is rea-
son to conclude that a serious violation, requiring a full hearing, has
probably occurred. Any hearing is conducted before an administra-
tive panel with the lawyer having a right to a rehearing before the
full administrative board and a final right to review on the record in
an appellate court.
2 5
This model is essentially that of civil procedure of the trial court, with
three significant variations. First, there is a required screening by the dis-
ciplinary agency to determine whether lodging a formal charge would be
warranted. Functionally, this resembles the probable cause hearing in
criminal procedure. It screens out those complaints for which the evidence
is insufficient to get to a trier of fact, and synthesizes the evidence when it
meets the sufficiency test, in the latter case laying the foundation for pos-
sible "plea bargaining." The second variation from the civil procedure
model concerns discovery. In some jurisdictions, the accused lawyer has
the same rights of discovery as are available in civil actions in the trial
court of general jurisdiction, 26 but the prevailing pattern gives the accused
only informal access to the prosecution's dossier.27 Third, except in Texas
and Georgia, there is no right to a jury trial.2
The prevailing model thus may be described as a relatively formal ver-
sion of administrative law procedure. Its elements include:
-The benefit of pre-charge screening by the disciplinary enforcement
agency;
2
-The right to notice and a statement of the charge or grievance; 30
-The right to formal or informal discovery;3"
-The right to assistance of counsel; 2
-The rights to subpoena witnesses and evidence, to cross-examine ad-
25. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 99 (footnote omitted); see also STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILYrr PROCEEDINGS (1979) [hereinafter 1979 ABA STANDARDS].
26. See, e.g., CAl.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6085 (West 1974).
27. See 1979 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25, § 8.29.
28. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 99.
29. 1979 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25, §§ 8.4-.6.
30. Id. § 8.23.
31. Id. § 8.29.
32. Id. § 8:34.
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verse witnesses, and to exclude evidence inadmissible under the rules of
evidence;"3
-The requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence or, in
some cases, by clear and convincing evidence; 4 and
-The right to judicial review.35
The large majority of lawyer disciplinary matters do not go the entire
route, however, or even beyond the stage of informal investigation. Two
sets of circumstances contribute to this phenomenon. First, most griev-
ances are essentially minor contract or performance disputes-charges of
inattention, excessive fees, inadequate results-or semi-paranoiac and
fully paranoiac grievances about justice gone wrong. At the stage of infor-
mal investigation the disciplinary agency rejects the complaints that ap-
pear to be baseless and mediates the minor ones that appear to have merit.
The common account among professionals in the field, and the availa-
ble statistics, indicate that this pattern of screening through administrative
review operates in all jurisdictions. There are no uniformly recognized
categories of stages of the disciplinary process, and for this reason there
are also no nationally recognized procedural statistics with respect to dis-
ciplinary matters. The available statistics are therefore not fully compara-
ble from jurisdiction to jurisdiction or year to year. Nevertheless, there is
a general pattern, in which the ratio of "complaints received" to "number
of lawyers formally charged" ranges from around 15:1 (for example, Flor-
ida) to around 30:1 (for example, Tennessee).
3 6
The second factor reducing the number of grievances that reach the
hearing stage is the likelihood that cases involving negligence or incompe-
tence serious enough to impel formal legal recourse will find such recourse
outside the disciplinary system. Generally it is not worthwhile to the com-
plainant to pursue the disciplinary route in a case of serious malpractice
because the payoff to the injured party will be only psychic. The com-
plainant is better off bringing a civil action for malpractice, where the
lawyer's behavior can be assessed by a jury and her assets and liability
insurance can be reached for compensation.
Since petty cases and serious negligence cases are shunted off in these
ways, the remaining disciplinary cases typically are ones that involve
fraud, misappropriation, bribery, tax evasion, or other opprobrious (and
33. Id. §§ 8.32, 8.35, 8.36.
34. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 108-10. At least one state, Georgia, employs the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 109 n.36.
35. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 111-14.
36. The only source of data on disciplinary proceedings is the annual Survey on Lawyer Disci-
pline Systems, compiled by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional Disci-
pline and Center for Professional Responsibility. The survey shows the following for a group of more
or less representative states:
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usually illegal) behavior. Moreover, in cases that go to disciplinary trial
there often is, or has been, or may be, a parallel criminal investigation.
And for this reason in turn, the increasingly formal character of procedure
in these hearings and, in particular, the rules governing self-
incrimination, appear to be central to most major disciplinary proceedings.
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION IN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A contested disciplinary hearing thus can involve not only professional
misconduct, sanctionable by disbarment or lesser penalty, but also a crimi-
nal offense. A simple example is a charge that a lawyer misappropriated a
client's funds, an act that would constitute both professional misconduct
and the crime of theft. Another example is fraud against a third party,
which is professional misconduct and in most circumstances would also
involve the crime of mail fraud."7 In a proceeding involving such charges,
the testimony of the lawyer, or evidence consisting of documents in his
possession, can be prime relevant evidence. The key legal question is how
far such testimony and evidence are protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
A. Privilege Not To Testijy
The privilege of refusing to testify against one's self in a criminal case,
conferred by the Fifth Amendment, applies by virtue of the Fourteenth
TABLE ONE
A B C D
Number Estimated Complaints Number of
of Resident Complaints Resulting Lawyers
Lawyers Received by in Finding Formally
Agency of Probable Charged
Cause
Arizona 7,493 1,976 242 51
ratio: A/B =3.3:1 B/C=8:1 B/D=39:1
Florida 27,164 6,268 390 12
4.3:1 16:1 16:1
Illinois 42,357 4,779 184 184
8.9:1 26:1 26:1
Massachusetts 24,691 1,524 94 94
16:1 16:1 16:1
Minnesota 13,184 1,244 251 50
11:1 5:1 25:1
Tennessee 9,676 715 157 26
14:1 4.6:1 28:1
Source: ABA CENTER FOR PROFE.SSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY & ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAi. DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, Chart I (1986).
37. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). Indeed, the Second Circuit has gone so far as to hold
that a lawyer's concealed conflict of interest can constitute mail fraud. United States v. Bronston, 658
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Amendment to proceedings in state tribunals."8 The privilege applies both
where the testimony is sought in a criminal proceeding and where the
testimony is sought in a non-criminal proceeding but reveals conduct that
is a crime; such testimony which reveals a crime might later be used in a
criminal proceeding against the witness.3 9 It is settled that lawyer discipli-
nary proceedings are among the proceedings in which the privilege ap-
plies.4" Hence, a lawyer may refuse in a disciplinary proceeding to give
testimony that tends to show that he has committed a crime.
To protect the privilege, the Supreme Court has ruled that no adverse
consequence such as disbarment can be imposed for the act of invoking the
privilege.41 A further and more difficult question is whether an adverse
inference of fact may be drawn from the refusal to testify. Whether such
an inference is permissible has not been settled under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but rather depends on state law. In turn, the state rule is
determined by whether the state, by statute or common law, characterizes
disciplinary proceedings as criminal or quasi-criminal, on the one hand,
or civil, on the other. Most states regard disciplinary proceedings as
quasi-criminal and consequently disallow an adverse inference where a
defendant has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. 42 Some
courts, however, consider disciplinary proceedings to be civil in nature for
almost all purposes, and therefore allow an adverse inference to be drawn
even where the defendant has invoked the privilege.43
B. Immunity
If no adverse inferences can be drawn and if the disciplinary authority
cannot by other evidence prove the facts showing professional misconduct,
the prosecution fails unless evidence can be obtained from the lawyer her-
self. One escape for the disciplinary prosecutor is to arrange immunity for
the lawyer against subsequent criminal prosecution. Transactional immu-
nity bars prosecution for any crime included in the transaction to which
the testimony pertains. To confer transactional immunity is therefore to
insulate the lawyer from any criminal prosecution for the matters to be
covered by her testimony. Under the constitutional law of some states,
38. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
39. Id. at 11; Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-05 (1977).
40. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
41. Id. at 516.
42. See, e.g., State Bar v. Woll, 387 Mich. 154, 194 N.W.2d 835 (1972); In re Silverberg, 459
Pa. 107, 327 A.2d 106 (1974). Where the attorney refuses to testify or to answer the original com-
plaint, but does not do so on the grounds of privilege, however, most courts will treat the proceeding
as civil and allow adverse inferences to be drawn. See, e.g., In re Randel, 158 N.Y. 216, 52 N.E. 1106
(1899); In re Vitetta, 74 A.D.2d 860, 426 N.Y.S.2d 13 (App. Div. 1980); In re Davis, 279 S.C. 532,
309 S.E.2d 5 (1983); In re Marine, 82 Wis. 2d 612, 264 N.W.2d 290 (1978).
43. State v. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972).
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transactional immunity is required before testimony can be compelled."
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
only use immunity.45 A lawyer-witness who is given use immunity can be
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony so long as that testimony,
and other evidence to which it may lead, is not used against him in any
later criminal proceeding. A subsequent prosecution, however, can be
based on independently derived evidence.46
Ordinarily, only the prosecutor can confer, or request that a court con-
fer, criminal immunity.47 Hence, the professional disciplinary authority
depends on the cooperation of the prosecutor in this respect.
Assuming that the lawyer-witness is given the required immunity re-
garding subsequent criminal prosecution, the next question is whether his
testimony can be compelled for use against him in the disciplinary pro-
ceeding. Put differently, is the penalty that might be imposed in the disci-
plinary proceeding itself a "crime," about which the lawyer may refuse to
testify even where he has been given the requisite immunity against fur-
ther criminal prosecution? The prevailing view is that professional sanc-
tions and proceedings are not criminal for this purpose.4' Hence, a lawyer
who has been given the requisite immunity against criminal prosecution
has an obligation to answer questions about his professional conduct even
though doing so may render him guilty of professional misconduct. 49
Sanctions for refusal to comply with this obligation include contempt."0
The disciplinary tribunal may also draw adverse inferences as to the facts,
on the familiar evidentiary rule that an adverse inference may be drawn
from refusal to produce evidence if withholding is not privileged. 51
44. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 509-10, 362 N.E.2d 592, 595-96, 393
N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1977).
45. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1970); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1970).
46. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 457; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
47. See Note, Prospective Determinations of Derived Use in Civil Proceedings: Upsetting the
Immunity Balance, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 990, 997-98 (1982).
48. See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 1977); Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878,
886, 544 P.2d 929, 933, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793, 797 (1976); In re March, 71 Ill. 2d 382, 395, 376
N.E.2d 213, 218 (1978); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 318-19, 329 A.2d 1,
7 (1974); In re Connaghan, 613 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Mo. 1981) (en bane); Anonymous Attorneys v. Bar
Ass'n of Erie County, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 510-11, 362 N.E.2d 592, 595, 393 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963-64
(1977); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Graziani, 157 W. Va. 167, 170-72,
200 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1973). See generally Annotation, Use in Disbarment Proceeding of Testimony
Given by Attorney in Criminal Proceeding Under Grant of Immunity, 62 A.L.R.3d 1145 (1975); C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 99.
49. See In re March, 71 111. 2d 382, 398, 376 N.E.2d 213, 220 (1978); see also Comment, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings: What Ever Happened to
Spevack?, 23 VILL. L. REv. 127 (1977).
50. See Anonymous Attorneys v. Bar Ass'n of Erie County, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 362 N.E.2d 592, 393
N.Y.S.2d 961 (1977). See generally Florida Bar v. Doe, 384 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1980); Minnesota State
Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, 311 Minn. 276, 248 N.W.2d 733 (1976).
51. See Heidt, supra note 4, at 1108-09.
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Although testimony given in a disciplinary proceeding under a grant of
immunity may be used as evidence against the attorney concerning the
pending charges, it is questionable whether such testimony could support
new charges not part of the original complaint. In re Ruffalo52 indicates
that a defendant is entitled to adequate notice of the charges against him,
and many courts will find error where the complaint against an attorney
has been substantially amended during the proceedings.5 3 On this basis,
the institution of a subsequent action against the attorney might be neces-
sary. However, not all courts follow this strict approach.5"
Again assuming that the requisite immunity has been granted, it would
also seem that the lawyer could be disbarred or otherwise professionally
disciplined for refusing to answer questions. Many states will find that it
is professional misconduct to refuse to respond to a valid disciplinary in-
quiry.55 If such a disciplinary inquiry is not interdicted by constitutional
privilege, it is valid; and if immunity has been granted, there is no consti-
tutional privilege. The refusal to respond in these circumstances is there-
fore itself professional misconduct.5  On the basis of DR 1-102, 57 how-
ever, some courts have held that it is not a disciplinary violation to refuse
to respond to inquiries.55
That a lawyer must respond to inquiries may seem to conflict with the
rule that a lawyer's invocation of the self-incrimination privilege cannot
be a basis for disbarment or other professional sanction. 9 A corollary to
this privilege is that a lawyer may not be required to choose between
relinquishing the privilege and automatically suffering professional disci-
pline.60 However, where the lawyer claims the privilege and is then
granted the requisite immunity, she has obtained the benefits of the privi-
lege. The privilege protects against incrimination by one's own testimony,
52. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the Virgin Islands v. Johnson,
447 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Conduct of Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 676, 642 P.2d 286, 291
(1982).
54. See State v. Cacnen, 235 Kan. 451, 460, 681 P.2d 639, 644 (1984) (due process imposes no
strict requirements for setting forth allegations); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Leonard,
212 Neb. 379, 383, 322 N.W.2d 794, 796 (1982) (disciplinary proceeding is not lawsuit with formali-
ties of pleading; "technicalities" may not be invoked to defend charges).
55. See MODE. Ruims OF PROFESSIONAL CONDU(-r Rule 8.1(b) (1981); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAi. RESPONSIBli.rrY DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6) (1981); see also In re Serstock, 316
N.W.2d 559, 560-62 (Minn. 1982) (refusal to cooperate with ethics committee one of grounds war-
ranting disbarment).
56. See In re March, 71 111. 2d 382, 400, 376 N.E.2d 213, 220 (1978).
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFE.SSIONAL. RESPONSIBII.IrY DR 1-102 (1981).
58. See, e.g., In re Geurts, 290 Or. 241, 247-48, 620 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1980) (failure to respond
to bar's inquiries not grounds for discipline). See generally Annotation, Failure to Co-operate with or
Obey Disciplinaty Authorities as Ground for Disciplining Attorney-Modern Cases, 37 A.L.R.4th
646 (1985).
59. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-16 (1967).
60. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968).
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not against loss of a valuable right or status resulting from such testimony.
There is an anomaly, if not a contradiction, in holding that disciplinary
proceedings are sufficiently "criminal" to preclude drawing adverse infer-
ences from the accused's invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination,"1 while also holding that they are sufficiently not "crimi-
nal" that disbarment may be imposed despite the accused's receipt of im-
munity. The effect of adhering to both propositions is that the grounds for
discipline must be established either by independent evidence, or by the
lawyer's testimony compelled by removing the risk that it will send him to
jail. That conclusion is not unreasonable, however awkward the premises
from which it is derived.
C. Protection of Records
In the absence of constitutional privilege, a lawyer in a disciplinary
proceeding has a duty to comply with a subpoena or equivalent demand
for the production of documents concerning his professional conduct. 2
How does the privilege against self-incrimination operate where the docu-
ments tend to prove conduct constituting a crime on the part of the
lawyer?
In Boyd v. United States, decided in 1886, the Supreme Court held that
the act of producing documents was the equivalent of giving testimony.
On this premise, a person could not be compelled to respond to a sub-
poena to produce documents that incriminated him."3 Various exceptions
to the Boyd rule were developed. For example, a person could be com-
pelled to produce someone else's documents in his possession, even if they
incriminated the individual producing them. Thus, a corporate officer
could be compelled to produce incriminating corporate records.64 Further-
more, the "required records" exception held that if the records in question
were required by law to be maintained, their production was required
notwithstanding their incriminating character.
65
For a time, the Supreme Court seemed to be going in the direction of
expanding Boyd.66 This trend was short-lived. In Couch v. United
61. See supra text accompanying note 41.
62. See Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vicks, 40 Tenn. App. 206, 214, 290 S.W.2d
871, 875 (1955), citing People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
63. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.
1939).
64. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
65. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
66. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (three-part test for determining what
constitutes legitimate "required" records); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967); Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (not all records can be required by law to be
kept).
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States67 the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege is personal,
protecting only against one's having to tender self-incriminating evidence.
On this basis, the Court held that when records had been turned over to
an accountant they were outside of the "private enclave" and not pro-
tected. Similarly, in Bellis v. United States, 8 the Court held that an attor-
ney could not claim privilege for records of a dissolved law firm because
the privilege is personal and hence not applicable to the records of a col-
lective entity.
Application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to documents, whatever
their character or location, was significantly undermined in Fisher v.
United States. 9 There the Court held that Fisher's tax records, prepared
by his accountant but in the possession of his attorney, were not privi-
leged. The original preparation of the documents was a voluntary act, not
"compelled"; the production of the documents was not the giving of testi-
mony. Hence the production of the documents was not protected by the
Fifth Amendment. "The taxpayer's privilege under [the Fifth] Amend-
ment is not violated by enforcement of the summonses involved in these
cases because enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel'
the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a
'witness' against himself."'70
Inquiry next shifted to whether the production of documents was an act
equivalent to giving testimony, even if the contents of the documents were
not privileged. 7 1 In United States v. Doe,7 2 the Court held that the fact
that the contents of documents tended to incriminate the producer did not
make them privileged, following Fisher in the proposition that informa-
tion committed to documents is not testimony.73 Doe recognized, however,
that the act of producing a document could be an affirmation of the docu-
ment's authenticity and hence equivalent to testimony. The court went on
to say, however, that use immunity could be given as to that act.7 4 Hence,
a lawyer can be compelled to produce documents without a grant of im-
munity as to their contents, so long as immunity is granted against use of
67. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
68. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
69. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
70. Id. at 397.
71. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (attorney's records seized in valid search and
seizure not privileged because attorney was not "compelled" to produce the documents himself). See
generally Note, In re Doe: Required Records and the Fifth Amendment, 16 CONN. L. REv. 1021
(1984) (discussing Fifth Amendment as it affects compelled production of documents); Comment,
Constitutional Law: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Denied as to Documents Recovered by
Taxpayer from His Accountant and Transferred to His Attorney, 59 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1975).
72. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
73. Id. at 612.
74. Id. at 612-17.
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the act of production to authenticate them."5 If the documents can be inde-
pendently authenticated, for example by a client or by the lawyer's secre-
tary or associate, then the documents can be presented in evidence in a
disciplinary proceeding. 6
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
In an earlier day, a disciplinary proceeding was something like an
ouster from a fraternity. Membership in the bar was considered a privi-
lege; abuse of the privilege in the form of serious misbehavior was consid-
ered a ground for its termination; and the fraternity understood that a
charge of such misbehavior would be brought only if it could be proved.
Prosecution of charges was therefore generally summary, and procedural
safeguards correspondingly limited. That is, the real and vital normative
controls were within the profession as a social group and included such
"informal" sanctions as disapprobation, imputation of bad reputation, and
denial of usual professional courtesies. Disciplinary proceedings operated
as a final and formal memorialization of an informal but effective verdict
already reached by professional peers.
Since those days the structure of the profession has changed in the lo-
calities in which most lawyers practice. Some lawyers still practice in the
old setting-small cities with a relatively small bar of mostly general
practitioners who know each other and each other's technical and ethical
capabilities and limitations 7-but the large majority of lawyers practice
in an impersonal professional cosmopolis. There are literally thousands of
lawyers within the daily work radius of most contemporary practicing
lawyers. Inside the professional cosmopolis the members are separated
from each other into professional "neighborhoods" by specialization and
subspecialization, status stratification, and the enclosures of firms, corpo-
rate law departments, government offices, and legal service agencies.78
There is a professional community only in name. The older social con-
trols, based on first hand acquaintance with personalities, reliable gossip,
75. Id. at 617 n.17.
76. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 945 (10th Cir.) (attorney held in contempt
for refusing to produce client files that would tend to incriminate attorney; such files were held for
client by attorney in representational capacity, and their production by attorney was therefore unpro-
tected by privilege), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); Florida Bar v. White, 384 So. 2d 1266 (Fla.
1980) (attorney compelled, without grant of immunity, to produce records of his trust account); In re
Zisook, 88 Il1. 2d 321, 430 N.E.2d 1037 (1981) (attorney members of professional corporation could
not invoke Fifth Amendment protection for documents in his possession belonging to corporate entity);
Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection for the Contents of Preexisting Documents: United
States v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023 (1984).
77. See generally M. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND His COMMUNrrY (1967); Landon, Clients,
Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice, 1985 Am.
B. FOUND. Rts. J. 81.
78. See generally J. HEINZ & E. LAUMAN, CHICAGO LAWYERS (1982).
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and continual professional interaction, have become both ineffective and
intolerable-ineffective because there is no face-to-face professional com-
munity having a shared awareness of who are the deviants, and intolera-
ble because imposing sanctions informally without real informal knowl-
edge is bound to result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Lawyers have thus become a more or less faceless vocational category,
membership in which can be clearly identified only by reference to the
system of official licensure. The transformation occurred at different rates
in different places, beginning with such large cities as New York, Los
Angeles, and Chicago. It has accelerated with the rapid increase in the
number of lawyers since the 1950's, such that the bar has more than
doubled in size in one professional generation."' The profession's con-
sciousness of the change has of course lagged behind the change itself.
Even now the profession has difficulty recognizing that it is qualitatively
and irreversibly different from what it used to be.80
Nevertheless, the nature of modern disciplinary process bears the un-
mistakable imprint of this transformation. Disciplinary proceedings no
longer legally confirm antecedent informal judgments by professional
peers; they are instead a formal legal method by which the judgments
themselves are made on behalf of the profession. This is reflected in the
legal concept of disciplinary proceeding that gained rising currency from
the 1950's onward: The license to practice law is now recognized as, if not
a right in all respects, certainly a valuable personal interest, and as such is
subject to termination only upon substantial proof established through
procedures meeting standards of fundamental fairness. Behind this
changed view one can discern recognition that the bar could no longer be
treated as the closed fraternity that it once imagined itself to be. In any
event, since the mid-1960's, lawyer disciplinary procedure in most juris-
dictions has been well on its way to full formalization. In the mid-1960's
the Supreme Court appeared to be on its way to constitutionalizing law-
yer disciplinary procedure, just as it was constitutionalizing criminal
procedure.
What has happened since is a two-fold turn of events. On the one hand,
79. See B. CURRAN, K. RosICH, C. CARSON & M. PuccErnT, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL RE-








80. See AMERICAN BAR AS'N COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAW PROFESSIONALISM 1-11 (1986).
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the legal profession itself has come to consider disciplinary proceedings to
require great formality. If anything, the procedural protections now com-
monly provided in such proceedings-particularly the right to informal
screening, and in many states, the right to have at least the preliminary
inquiry conducted in private8 1-exceed those in normal civil litigation. At
the same time, the Supreme Court has declined to impose an extensive
due process jurisprudence on lawyer disciplinary proceedings. Most im-
portant has been the Court's refusal to treat disciplinary proceedings as
criminal and its limitation of the effective scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination. In disciplinary proceedings today a lawyer cannot be
suspended or disbarred unless a substantial case is made out against her
through admissible evidence, and she cannot be made to testify against
herself. However, a lawyer is subject to conviction on the basis of her
papers, a potentially rich source of incriminating evidence. Given the dis-
appearance of the traditional sources of information about a lawyer's be-
havior-the collective informal perception of professional
peers-documentary sources usually are about all there is on which to
establish a case. Thus, the somewhat convoluted development of the legal
doctrine concerning the availability of the privilege against self-
incrimination appears to have responded appropriately to changes in the
structure of the legal profession and the significance of lawyer disciplinary
hearings.
81. See 1979 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25, § 8.24.
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